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THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT UNDER ATTACK
I. Introduction
The expansion of nuclear power as a commercial energy source has been a
fertile ground for litigation over the past twenty-four years. Recently, the op-
ponents of nuclear development gained a victory which may precipitate a slow-
down in development that previous administrative and court actions have been
unable to accomplish. The successful challenge was based on an attack on the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act.'
Until 1977, the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act had not been
tested judicially. In Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission,' however, the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina ruled that the liability limitations in the
Price-Anderson Act violated the due process and equal protection provisions of
the fifth amendment. The action sought a declaratory judgement on the con-
stitutionality of the Act by plaintiffs who lived in the vicinity of two nuclear
power plants being constructed by the Duke Power Company. The decision was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court in November, 1977 and probable
jurisdiction was noted.'
This note will review the important provisions of the Price-Anderson Act to
show its significance in the nuclear power regulatory scheme. Then an analysis
of the district court opinion which declared the Act unconstitutional will be
made. This analysis will focus on the potential resolutions for each of the key
issues. Although it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will discuss every one of
the issues, it will be useful to analyze them all because of the potential for future
challenges to the Act.
A brief review of the history of commercial nuclear power will place the
significance of the Price-Anderson Act in perspective. The United States
first committed itself to the development of peaceful uses of nuclear power
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 4 The initial development of nuclear power
was strictly a governmental function because of the security precautions taken to
protect our technical superiority. After the Soviet Union had achieved a nuclear
weapons capability, however, Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,'
lifted some of the security restraints and attempted to accelerate the development
of nuclear power through the involvement of the private sector. The Act re-
iterated the commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear power and outlined the
regulatory procedures that would allow the participation of private industry.
By 1956 the first reactor facility was within one year of being operational.
At this point serious questions arose about the availability of liability insurance
1 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210 (Supp. 1977).
2 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
3 Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.; United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 426
(1977) (actions consolidated).
4 Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
5 Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1954), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2281 (Supp.
1977).
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for the various nuclear projects then under way or in the planning stages. The
problem encountered was the lack of any available data on the risks involved in
nuclear power. Individual and commercial liability policies excluded losses
caused by nuclear contamination because of insurers' inability to determine the
potential losses. In 1957, however, the insurance industry formed two pools.
A "pool" is a group of insurance companies that collectively make their assets
available in the event of a large claim so as to provide more insurance coverage
than any individual company could provide. These pools provided insurance
coverage to operators of nuclear reactors up to a limit of $60 million.
In addition to this private effort, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
studied the problem extensively and concluded that the $60 million in coverage
was not adequate to protect the public from potential losses. The solution to
the problem was the Price-Anderson Act.' The major provisions of that revision
to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 required that power plants with a capacity
of 100 megawatts (electric) carry the maximum amount ($60 million) of private
insurance and, in addition, stated that the government would provide $500 mil-
lion indemnity for a flat rate per megawatt of thermal capacity. In any single
nuclear incident the liability of a nuclear power plant operator was limited to
$560 million. By subsequent amendments, the applicability of the Act was ex-
tended in 1965 and 1975 so as to be effective until 1987.
II. The Price-Anderson Act
A. Provisions of the Act
The Price-Anderson Act, which itself was an amendment to the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, has undergone a number of revisions since its enactment in
1957. The present provisions of the Act relating to power reactors may be sum-
marized as follows:'
1. Adequate financial protection is required as a condition of licensing."
2. Any reactor with a rated capacity of 100 megawatts (electric) must carry
the maximum amount of financial protection available from private sources. 9
3. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will provide indemnity to the
extent of the difference between $560 million and the private financial
protection required. This indemnity shall not exceed $500 million.'0
4. The aggregate liability for a single nuclear incident shall not exceed $560
million or the amount of private insurance available, whichever is greater.
In the event of a nuclear incident involving damages in excess of the
liability limit, Congress will thoroughly review the incident and take appro-
priate action for disaster relief.'1
6 Pub. L. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210 (Supp. 1977).
7 The Act also includes provisions for experimental installations and the nuclear-powered
ship Savannah which will not be discussed here. The United States Navy's nuclear-powered
ships are not covered by the Act.
8 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(a) (Supp. 1977).
9 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(b) (Supp. 1977).
10 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(c) (Supp. 1977).
11 42 U.S.O.A. § 2210(e) (Supp. 1977).
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5. The Commission collects a flat fee ($30) per megawatt (thermal) of
rated capacity.1
2
6. In the event of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence," the nuclear plant
operator waives any defense based on negligence, contributory negligence,
charitable or governmental immunity, assumption of the risk and, to some
extent, statute of limitations. 2
7. Provisions are made for the transfer of all claims to a single United States
district court and for the percentage distribution of all claims when the
total will exceed the liability limitation. If the total claims are adjudged to
exceed the limitation, no insurer may pay out over 15 percent of the limit
without court approval.'
4
These current provisions include several significant changes in the Act. As
of August 1, 1977 the pools were able to furnish insurance coverage of $140 mil-
lion.' 5 In addition, the insurance pools can collect $5 million per reactor from
each nuclear operator in the event a nuclear incident occurs which causes damage
in excess of the $140 million coverage. This is called a retrospective premium.
It is collected only when the funds are needed to satisfy claims against one of the
insured nuclear plants. Currently, liability coverage under the Act is as follows:
$140 million primary insurance coverage through the private insurance pools,
$310 million available from retrospective premiums (62 nuclear reactors times
$5 million), and government indemnity of $110 million.'" Each year the amount
available from retrospective premiums will increase as the total number of oper-
ating reactors increases. The Act provides that once the liability coverage exceeds
$560 million, government indemnity will no longer be available and the liability
limitation will rise with the available insurance coverage. Using the projected
number of operating reactors from the A.E.C. Staff Study on Price-Anderson,"
the liability limit should reach $1 billion around the year 1983.
Another important addition to the Act is the provision for congressional
review in the event a nuclear accident exceeds the liability limitations. The
legislative history of prior revisions indicated that Congress intended to conduct
such a review, but it had never been mandated by the provisions of the Act.
B. Purpose of Price-Anderson
Hearings conducted in 1956 indicated that the potential liability of nuclear
plant operators was a major roadblock to industrial participation in the nuclear
field.' To alleviate this difficulty, Congress fashioned an insurance-indemnity
program under the Act that was designed to: 1) insure adequate protection of
12 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(f) (Supp. 1977).
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(1) (Supp. 1977). This section gives the Commission the
power to incorporate these waivers, which are always required, into an indemnification agree-
ment.
14 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(2) (Supp. 1977).
15 Nuclear Liability Protection for the Public, NEL-PIA Reports, no. 3 at 4 (Sept. 1977).
16 Id. at 5.
17 16 A.E.L.J. 205, 252 (1974).




the public in the event of a nuclear accident and 2) promote the development of
the nuclear industry."9 The original provisions of the Act included a requirement
for private insurance, $500 million in government indemnification, and a $560
million limitation on liability. The Senate Report on the bill justified the limita-
tion of liability as a valid exercise of "the bankruptcy power of the United States
for it is improbable that any firm could survive claims against it of $500 million,
over and above insurance which might be available."2
Since enacted, Price-Anderson has been amended several times to extend
the expiration date and to modify the provisions of the Act.2 ' Its present form
was adopted in 1975 with the same purposes as the original Act but as will be
shown later the significance of those purposes had changed.
III. Attack on Price-Anderson
A. Statement of the Case
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Commission" was an action challenging the constitutionality of the provisions of
the Price-Anderson Act that impose a $560 million limitation on liability. The
plaintiffs were a group of people2' residing in the vicinity of two nuclear power
plants that were being constructed by the defendant Duke Power Company. They
claimed that but for the Price-Anderson Act, the plants would not have been built.
In addition to alleging that the normal operation of the nuclear plants would
have adverse effects on the environment, they alleged that the limitation of
liability would not adequately compensate them in the event of a catastrophic
release of radioactive debris and therefore that they would be deprived of in-
dividual property rights without due process of law. They also claimed that the
limitation on complete recovery creates an unreasonable classification of persons
who are denied the equal protection of the laws.
19 Id. at 1811.
20 Id. at 1816.
21 In 1965 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy considered the necessity for extending
the applicability of the Price-Anderson Act past its expiration date in 1967. Its report stated:
The Price-Anderson Act has clearly accomplished the second purpose for which it was
enacted-removal of the deterrent to private industrial participation in the atomic
energy program. This is obvious from the growth of the nuclear power industry
and the huge increase in the scope and complexity of commercial nuclear energy
activities. JOINT COMMITTEE ON AToMIc ENERGY REP. No. 883, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (Aug. 26, 1965).
The availability of private insurance had not substantially increased since 1957 and thus the
need to provide an adequate fund for payment of claims arising out of a nuclear incident was
still present. In addition, the Joint Committee saw a continued need to promote industrial
expansion of nuclear power. In discussing recent trends the Committee noted that the con-
cern centered not on the mere survival of the industry but rather on its continued tech-
nological advancements: "The development of some of these more advanced reactors is at
roughly the same stage today as was the case with low conversion ratio light water reactors
in 1957, and this development should similarly be encouraged through extension of the Price-
Anderson legislation." Id. at 8.
The Price-Anderson Act was extended for ten years by Pub. L. 89-645, enacted in 1966.
A major addition to the legislation was the inclusion of a waiver of defenses provision that
must be signed by a nuclear operator as part of the government indemnification agreement.
22 431 F. Supp. at 203.
23 No mention of the Carolina Environmental Study Group is made in the opinion. The
Group has standing if its members have standing as individuals. United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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The two nuclear plants are located within a twenty-mile radius of Charlotte,
North Carolina (one in North Carolina and one in South Carolina). Each was
being constructed by the Duke Power Company under permits issued by the
Atomic Energy Commission (now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), the
plaintiffs having unsuccessfully opposed the issuance of the construction licenses.
Neither plant was licensed to operate at the time of the trial.
The defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that
the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims were not ripe for adjudicaiion.
The trial judge withheld a decision on the motion until evidence was presented
at a hearing. A major portion of the evidence was devoted to assessing the likeli-
hood of a nuclear accident and the extent of the injury and damages expected
from such an accident. The defendants relied heavily on the Reactor Safety
Study 4 published by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in October, 1975.5
The conclusions reached in the Reactor Safety Study cannot be easily summar-
ized, but the results indicate that any major nuclear incident is extremely un-
likely. 6 Even given the deviations predicted in the report, the results suggest
that the risk of nuclear accident is far less than any other man-caused or natural
accident.2"
The plaintiffs presented evidence that attacked the credibility of the Re-
actor Safety Study. Some of the major deficiencies cited were:
1. Evaluation of component and human failure is impossible under the cur-
rent state of the arts.
2. Safety systems have never been tested under actual accident conditions.
3. Sabotage was not considered.
4. Radiation effects on health were not fully evaluated.
5. Deviation from the probabilities stated could be much greater than those
estimated in the report.
6. Groundwater contamination was not considered.
7. The fault-tree and event-tree analysis technique eliminated many of the
possible accident sequences.
2 s
On these facts the court resolved the issue of risk on a middle ground between the
two parties:
24 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI',ISSION, WASH-1400 (1975).
25 This study, the most comprehensive available on nuclear plant safety, was conducted
over several years under the independent direction of Professor Norman C. Rasmussen of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
26 For example, assuming that one hundred nuclear reactors are in operation, the report
concluded that that there is a one in ten thousand chance that an accident will cause one
immediate death. That accident is estimated to result in 170 latent cancer deaths per year
and $900 million in property damage. WASH-1400 at 84-85.
27 The risks claimed for nuclear power plants were approximately the same as the risk of
injury from meteorites. WASH-1400 at 120.
28 A complete discussion of the evidence appears at 431 F. Supp. at 210-14.
[June 1978]
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[T]he significant conclusion is that under the odds quoted by either side,
a nuclear catastrophe is a real, not fanciful, possibility. The court finds,
without being as rosily optimistic as the Reactor Safety Study nor as pessi-
mistic as Dr. Kendall, that a core melt at McGuire or Catawba can reason-
ably be expected to produce hundreds or thousands of fatalities, numerous
illnesses, genetic effects of unpredictable degree for succeeding generations
... and widespread damage to property.29
Having resolved this basic issue, the court went on to consider each of the
elements necessary to establish the plaintiffs' case.
B. Causation
The establishment of a causal relationship between the allegedly unconstitu-
tional Act and the injuries sustained is critical to the discussions of standing and
ripeness which follow this section. Difticulties arise because the liability limitation
provisions under attack have not caused any present injury and it cannot be
said that injury is imminent. There is no question that if the plaintiffs were
uncompensated victims of a nuclear accident the causal relationship between
the limitation of liability and the inadequate compensation would be established.
In the instant case, however, the relationship is not so obvious.
The plaintiffs must establish that without Price-Anderson the nuclear power
plants in question would not have been built. As mentioned previously, one of
the purposes of the Act was to promote industrial participation in nuclear power
in the fact of serious concern over potential liability. The Act was unquestionably
a vital catalyst in the early development of the industry."0 As the industry ma-
tured, Price-Anderson played a continuing role in the development of nuclear
power, but the emphasis had changed.
In 1956, testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
(J.C.A.E.) made it clear that the nuclear industry could not survive without
some type of insurance program. Some of that testimony was cited in the
Carolina Environmental Study Group opinion:
[I]t appears to be virtually unanimously agreed that a legislative solution to
the public liability problem is necessary if one of the principal purposes of
the act-"to encourage widespread participation in the development and
utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes"-is to be possible. ...
[I]f the financial protection needed is not reasonably available, we will not
be able to go ahead with the Westinghouse testing reactor [at Waltz Mill,
Pal .3 1
This testimony was representative of the industry-wide feelings on the issue.
By 1975 the emphasis of the testimony before the J.C.A.E. had changed.
Price-Anderson was seen as a spur to further development of the industry rather
29 431 F. Supp. at 214. McGuire and Catawba are the nuclear generating stations in
question.
30 See note 22 supra.
31 431 F. Supp. at 215.
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than as a prerequisite for its continued existence. 2 Some of the 1975 testimony
addressed the issue directly:
A more serious difficulty with the position that unlimited liability should be
allocated to the industry lies in the validity of the assumption as to the con-
sequences of such a policy. Although it is difficult to assess what the actual
result of termination of Price-Anderson protection would be, it seems clear
that it would not result in the total cessation of the construction of new
plants. The situation is quite different from that which obtained in 1957.
Utilities, vendors and architects-engineers have substantial investment in the
industry and have a history of safe operation. While it is difficult to evaluate
public statements by industry as to the impact of termination of Price-
Anderson in the current political context, these statements do not indicate
that it intends to abandon the nuclear field. 33
Even the 1975 testimony quoted in Carolina Environmental Study Group to
support a finding of causation lacked the definitive statements made in the
1956-57 hearings. 4
Other authorities are in accord with the 1975 testimony. The A.E.C. Staff
Study of the Price-Anderson Act concludes that "no consensus has been ex-
pressed as to whether utilities would not build and operate reactors, or that large
suppliers would not fabricate reactor components in the absence of the limitation
of liability."' 5 In 1975, Senator Tunney opposed the extension of the Act because
"the available evidence suggests that nuclear power plants would continue in
operation even without the protection of Price-Anderson."' 6
In addition to this failure to show an industry-wide consensus, the district
court did not focus on the individual power plants in question. Would these
particular plants have been constructed in the absence of the Price-Anderson Act?
None of the evidence discussed in the opinion relates to these plants, but there is
testimony that is generally relevant. A statement made in 1976 by the president
of Duke Power Company revealed that it would attempt to continue using
nuclear power even without the Act. In his testimony, he recognized that
difficulties with suppliers would be encountered but expressed an intent to con-
tinue nuclear operations.'
A letter from the Duke Power Company outlined its commitment to nuclear
power but endorsed the Act because, "[flailure to extend Price-Anderson could
well cause erosion of this confidence, resulting in higher cost of capital and/or
inadequate supply. Such a consequence would only add to the consumer's
economic burden."'" This evidence, even viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, does not support the conclusion that "but for" the Act, the plants
would not have been built.
32 See S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2251; SELECTED MATERIALS ON ATOMIC ENERGY INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE
LEGISLATION, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
33 SELECTED MATERIALS ON ATomic ENERGY INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE LEGISLATION,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
34 431 F. Supp. at 215-18.
35 16 A.E.L.J. at 298.
36 S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2251, 2273.
37 431 F. Supp. at 218.
38 Id. at 218.
[June 1978]
[Vol. 53:954N]
In 1956 the Price-Anderson Act clearly was a prerequisite to the construc-
tion and operation of nuclear power plants, but that conclusion is no longer valid.
The lack of proof of causation (or the remoteness of the causation s") significantly
weakens the plaintiffs' case, as will be shown in the following sections.
C. Standing
The district court judge found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act. In determining what factors to
consider on the standing issue the court said: " 'Standing' focuses upon the
litigant and raises the question whether the litigant is the proper party to fight the
lawsuit, not the question of whether the issue is justiciable." '40 Quoting ex-
tensively from Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,4"
the court emphasized that standing requires a causal connection between the act
complained of and the asserted injury.
In Arlington Heights the Supreme Court held that potential tenants of a
real estate development had standing to challenge the defendant's refusal to
rezone a lot for multi-family dwellings. The specificity of the plans for the
project made the causal connection between the denial and the injury (inability
of the plaintiffs to live near their place of work) sufficiently concrete.
In Carolina Environmental Study Group, the court concluded that a "but
for" causal connection existed between the Act and the construction of the
nuclear plants. Those key words, "but for," are not words of art when used in
the context of standing. In Arlington Heights, the Court considered the necessary
causal relationship to establish standing in terms of "substantial probability."
There was a substantial probability that the housing project would be built if the
zoning restrictions were lifted. Therefore, failure to lift the restrictions was a
cause of the plaintiffs' inability to live in the vicinity of their work. Applying
that analysis to Carolina Environmental Study Group, it must be determined
whether there is a substantial probability that the plants would not have been
built without the Price-Anderson Act. The previous section on causation sug-
gests the absence of such a probability.
Another recent Supreme Court decision involving standing and the rela-
tionship between the injury and the action under attack was Simon ,. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Organization."2 That case was brought by indigent tenants
against the Internal Revenue Service. The plaintiff-respondents objected to an
IRS revenue ruling which granted favorable tax treatment to nonprofit hospitals
that offered only emergency room service to indigents. The plaintiffs contended
that the extension of these tax benefits to hospitals that did not extend more
comprehensive treatment to indigents was an improper interpretation of the
Internal Revenue Code. They alleged that they had sought and been denied,
39 Strictly speaking, the Price-Anderson Act does have a causal connection to the current
construction of power plants. Without the 1957 version of the Act the nuclear industry might
never have gotten off the ground. This line of causation seems to be much too attenuated to be
seriously considered.
40 431 F. Supp. at 219.
41 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
42 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
because of their indigency, treatment at hospitals enjoying tax benefits.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court that the
ruling was contrary to the Internal Revenue Code and ordered a dismissal for
lack of standing. In reviewing the principles of standing, the Court said:
In sum, when a plaintiff's standing is brought into issue, the relevant inquiry
is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has shown an
injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Absent
such a showing, exercise of its power by a federal court would be gratuitous
and thus inconsistent with the Art. III limitation.4 3
In its opinion, the Court conceded that the indigent plaintiffs had alleged an
injury, but asserted that they had failed to show that the injury could be traced
to the defendants' actions. The Court concluded that it was purely speculative
whether the hospitals would offer the desired services if the favorable tax treat-
ment were conditioned on a wider range of free services to indigents. The re-
spondents had submitted to the district court a statement made by an official of
a hospital association to Congress describing the importance of the favorable tax
treatment they receive as charitable corporations. The Solicitor General sub-
mitted evidence that challenged the reliance of hospitals on private philanthropy.
In light of this evidence the Court found that merely alleging that a hospital
receives substantial amounts of charitable contributions did not establish that
these hospitals were dependent on the contributions.
There is a strong similarity between the arguments presented by the plaintiffs
in Carolina Environmental Study Group and those presented by the plaintiffs
in Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization. Both attempt to rely on
general propositions drawn from congressional hearings to establish a specific
causal connection. Although the evidence in the former case is more detailed
than in the latter, there is still lacking the needed specificity to establish "a sub-
stantial likelihood that victory in this suit would result in respondents receiving
the hospital treatment they desire."4 Stated in terms of Carolina Environmental
Study Group there must be a substantial likelihood that declaring Price-
Anderson unconstitutional would result in the suspension of construction or
operation of the Duke Power Company power plants.
The issue of standing in Carolina Environmental Study Group presents a
different problem from that addressed in previous opinions. The injury alleged
is not a single injury, but several separate injuries. The first is the injury caused
by the low-level radioactive discharge that inevitably results from the operation
of a nuclear power plant" and the increased water temperatures in local water
sources used to cool the reactors. The second is the injury caused by the potential
for nuclear accidents; there is alleged an element of present injury in that the
specter of such a catastrophe causes great concern among local residents. Some
of the plaintiffs claim they have moved because of their fear of the consequences
43 Id. at 38 (emphasis supplied).
44 Id. at 45-46.




of reactor operations.4  A third element of injury is the inability to recover
adequate compensation in the event of a nuclear accident which causes damage
in excess of the Price-Anderson limitation. Accepting the fact that the first two
injuries "allege some threatened or actual injury" 4 there still exists the problem
of showing that they flow from the allegedly unconstitutional Act. The plaintiffs
do not allege any grounds for a direct attack on the plants themselves.4" Their
standing then must rest on the existence of a substantial likelihood that without
the Price-Anderson Act the plants would not have been built. As discussed
previously, the district judge did find a "but for" causal relationship between the
Act and the plants, but this finding can be seriously challenged in light of Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization.
The third injury (inadequate compensation) alleged does not have the
causality problems associated with the first two. The inability to get a complete
recovery of damages would be the direct result of the Price-Anderson liability
limitation. The issue here is the existence of any immediate injury. At the
present time, are these plaintiffs the proper persons to be bringing this action?
The question illustrates the overlap between standing and ripeness. An example
of this is the case of O'Shea v. Littleton49 which straddled the line between the
two issues. The plaintiffs in O'Shea, representing themselves and a class, com-
plained of discrimination in bond setting, sentencing and jury fee practices in
criminal cases before an Illinois county circuit court. The Supreme Court held
that the allegations of previous discriminatory practices against the class were
insufficient to show an immediate threat of repeated injury. The Court said:
"As in Golden v. Zwickler [394 U.S. 103] we doubt that there is 'sufficient im-
mediacy and reality' to respondent's allegations of future injury to warrant in-
vocation of the jurisdiction of the District Court."5
Even given the plaintiffs' evidence in Carolina Environmental Study Group
on the inevitability of a nuclear accident, the immediacy requirement of O'Shea
would not appear to be met. In O'Shea, the plaintiffs alleged that the dis-
crimination had occurred in a continuing pattern of injuries; but in Carolina
Environmental Study Group the plaintiffs could allege no pattern since over 300
reactor years5 of operation had not produced a nuclear accident. The present
plaintiffs stand in a better position only because there is some certainty that
people in the vicinity of a reactor will be injured if an accident were to occur of
-sufficient magnitude to invoke the liability limitation. The O'Shea plaintiff would
have to be arrested before there would be a possibility of discrimination. In both
cases, though, the nature of the speculation is similar.
The appellants, Duke Power Company and the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, will seek to have the Supreme Court reverse the district court and
46 No mention is made in the opinion of any allegations of a present decrease in property
values.
47 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
48 This suit will have no direct effect on the plants because no injunction or damages are
sought. Even if the Act is declared unconstitutional Duke may elect to continue with the con-
struction. Some of the plaintiffs unsuccessfully "fought against nuclear power at numerous
administrative and legal levels." 431 F. Supp. at 205.
49 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
50 Id. at 497.
51 431 F. Supp. at 214.
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remand the case because of a lack of standing.2 The district judge's finding of
a "but for" causal relationship between the Price-Anderson Act and the nuclear
power plants is the key to this issue. Although the lower court has made a strong
argument for the existence of the relationship, the facts relied upon are susceptible
to a different interpretation. It is because of this attenuated relationship between
the injury and the allegedly unconstitutional Act that the standing issue is im-
portant. The Supreme Court will have to relax the application of the standards
set out in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization3 in order to find
standing.5"
D. Ripeness
The question of ripeness is closely related to standing. The Article III
requirement of a "case or controversy" discussed in conjunction with standing
also has relevance in considering ripeness.5 The focus of ripeness is on the
readiness of the case for judicial review. The issues must be well-defined and
grounded on facts.
In analyzing the ripeness of Carolina Environmental Study Group, the
injuries alleged can be divided into two categories: those which are alleged to be
the immediate result of the normal operation of a nuclear power plant, and
those which are potential losses caused by the Price-Anderson limitation on
liability. The first of these, the immediate injuries, present an issue that is
sufficiently concrete to be ripe for review. The environmental impact of a
nuclear power plant can be accurately assessed. In the course of Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission licensing procedures, a detailed study of the consequences
of the plant's operation is made. Requiring the plaintiffs to wait until actual
operation of the plant would not appreciably sharpen the controversy.
A different result must be reached when considering the possible damages of
an uncompensated injury. The district judge compared the situation to the
"erosion taking" dealt with in the Regional Rail Reorganization Cases.," There,
the Supreme Court held that an issue was ripe although injury was only a
possibility. The Tucker Act had authorized the continued operation of eight
railroads during proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. Owners of interests in
the Penn Central Railroad objected to the operation, claiming that it jeopardized
the value of their assets and, as such, was a taking without just compensation.
The Court held the issue ripe because "failure to decide the availability of the
Tucker Act would raise the distinct possibility that those plaintiffs would suffer
an 'erosion taking' without adequate assurance that compensation will ever be
provided."57 Although the injuries complained of were not a certainty, the
Court held the issue to be ripe.
52 46 U.S.L.W. 3300 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1977) (72-262).
53 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
54 In Simon, the action was brought against the I.R.S. alone even though it was the
hospitals that had denied the medical treatment. It is unlikely that the mere presence of the
hospitals as defendants would have altered the result.
55 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
56 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
57 Id. at 124.
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The plaintiffs in Carolina Environmental Study Group stand in a weaker
position. Although specific probabilities cannot be assigned, the possibility of
uncompensated loss is somewhat more remote than the chance of "erosion tak-
ing." The Penn Central owners had shown that the railroad had operated with
large deficits in the past. It was not overly speculative to conclude that operation
under court supervision would not be any more successful. An uncompensated
injury in the Carolina Environmental Study Group case will result only if a
nuclear accident occurs, and if the extent of the damage caused exceeds liability
limitations, and if the plaintiffs are injured by the accident. The case is clearly
one in which the issues are too remote to warrant review at the present time.
Moreover, in the Regional Rail Reorganization Cases the Court relied on the
lack of any certain provision for adequate compensation. The Price-Anderson
Act, on the other hand, will provide certain compensation. Although the plain-
tiffs object to its reasonableness it also should be remembered that, in addition to
the indemnity provisions, the Act requires that Congress evaluate any nuclear
incident which exceeds liability limits to determine the necessity for additional
relief."8 Swift congressional action in the face of a disaster might render valid an
otherwise unacceptable provision. The issue of uncompensated injury is not
sufficiently concrete because there are too many variables that must be weighed
to determine the Act's constitutionality. Judicial action at this stage would be
engaging in constitutional adjudication in the abstract, a method that is com-
pletely unac,:eptable.59
To summarize, this case involves a ripe controversy only with regard to the
imminent injuries alleged. The potential for uncompensated loss cannot serve
as the basis for this action because the facts of the issue are not sufficiently
crystallized. This heightens the importance of the causation discussion because
the plaintiffs' standing to pursue the only issue that is ripe depends on the finding
of a causal connection between the Act and the construction of the power plants.
E. Merits
The previous sections dealing with standing and ripeness indicate that the
appellee-plaintiffs will have difficulty showing that they have met the threshold
requirements necessary to allow the Supreme Court to consider the merits of
their case. A review of these issues is undertaken here because the widespread
concern over nuclear power makes it likely that future challenges will be
mounted.
1. Due Process
The alleged violation of the due process clause is not a violation of pro-
cedural due process, but involves substantive due process. Although the lower
court opinion does not articulate the standards to be applied in determining
whether an act violates the due process clause, it will be assumed that the court
58 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(e) (Supp. 1977).
59 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947).
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intended to follow established principles. Due process requires that an act bear
a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective." The legislative action
cannot be so irrational that it may be branded "arbitrary."61
The opinion does not address the propriety of the legislative objective, but
clearly the regulation of nuclear power for the welfare of the industry and the
public is a permissible objective. It is the reasonableness of the means used to
reach the legislative objective that is the subject of the attack. The court's hold-
ing that the liability limitation provision of the Price-Anderson Act is a violation
of due process is based on three arguments: 1) the amount of recovery is not
rationally related to the potential losses; 2) the Act tends to encourage irre-
sponsible operation of nuclear power plants because the operators are insulated
from liability; and 3) there is no quid pro quo for the limitation on liability.
The first of these grounds represents an improper application of the "ra-
tional basis"6 test. The recovery, or limitation thereof, need only be rationally
related to the permissible legislative purpose. Other types of statutes (workmen's
compensation,63 no-fault insurance,64 malpractice limitations") have been up-
held even though these contain "arbitrary" limitations in the sense that the
amount selected cannot be derived from any mathematical formula. The
critical issue was the relationship between the limit and the purpose of the act.
The fact that the legislation is not in accord with the common law remedy is
immaterial. There is no vested interest in recovery on a common law right. In
Silver v. Silver,"6 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an auto-
mobile guest statute citing "the rule that the Constitution does not forbid the
creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common
law, to attain a permissible legislative object."67
The second of the court's reasons, that the Act fosters irresponsible opera-
tion, appears to be a matter of pure speculation on the part of the trial judge.
No evidence was introduced to support a conclusion that lax safety practices
occurred because of the liability limit. Even if the assumption is valid, it does not
support the argument for irrationality because of the existence of other incentives
for safe operation. The huge financial investment and the pervasive regulation
of the industry must be balanced against any negative effects of the Act. The
trial judge has substituted his opinion for the judgement of Congress on the ac-
ceptability of the balance. His views may be correct, but that does not mean the
Act is irrational.
The necessity for a quid pro quo when abolishing common law rights is not
firmly established. Replacement of a conimon law right with some other ac-
ceptable remedy stems from the decision in New York Central Railroad v.
White. 8 In upholding the constitutionality of a workmen's compensation
60 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1936).
61 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
62 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
63 New York Central Railroad v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
64 Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
65 Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) (remanded for
further consideration).
66 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
67 Id. at 122 (dicta).
68 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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statute, the Supreme Court analyzed the statutory remedy as a substitute for
common law remedies. The Court stated that it did no need to reach a con-
clusion as to the necessity for such a substitute. Although that point has never
been decided by the Supreme Court, later cases have intimated that there is no
requirement for an adequate substitute. " Several state courts have reviewed the
Supreme Court cases on the issue and expressed serious doubts about the absolute
necessity for a quid pro quo.0
Assuming that some adequate replacement for a common law remedy is re-
quired does not automatically invalidate the Price-Anderson Act. The Act
contains several provisions which can be viewed as substitutes for the common
law remedy, the most important of which is the waiver of defenses provision. The
defendants claim that the nuclear operators gave up significant rights which
benefit the public when the waiver of defenses provision became effective. The
court concluded that this was of no real benefit because the doctrine of strict
liability would be applied in North Carolina regardless of the Price-Anderson
Act. The court's generalized conclusion as to the present applicability of strict
liability without the Act is based on a citation from Dean Prosser." Although
there has never been a case dealing with a nuclear incident, an action was
brought as a result of nuclear weapons testing. In Bartholomae Corporation v.
United States72 the Ninth Circuit refused to apply strict liability where a nuclear
test caused damage to the buildings of the plaintiff. The case underscores the
speculative nature of any conclusion about strict liability.
73
More recently the Columbia University Legislative Drafting Research Fund
examined the situation. Its conclusion was relied upon in the Senate Report on
the latest revision to the Act:
The study concluded that the resulting legal situation in the event of a
nuclear incident would be chaotic. Injured parties would be subject to
whatever tort law prevailed in the State in which the incident occurred or in
which they suffered harm. There would be wide variation in the grounds
for recovery, the standards of proof, and the defenses available to the de-
fendants. Recovery would be uncertain and could be delayed for many
years.
74
The elimination of this uncertainty establishes the value of the waiver pro-
69 See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929); Arizona Employers Liab. Cases, 250 U.S. 400
(1919).
70 See Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); Mont-
gomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 444- (1975).
71 Although rockets already have made their appearance in the field of strict liability,
the first case raising the question as to the use of nuclear energy has yet to reach the
courts. When it does, it may be predicted with a good deal of confidence that this
is an area in which no court will, at last, refuse to recognize and apply the
principle of strict liability found in the cases which follow Rylands v. Fletcher.
PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 516 (4th Ed. 1971).
72 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957).
73 For a discussion of nuclear tort liability see Note, Nuclear Torts: The Price-Anderson
Act and the Potential for Uncompensated Injury, 11 N. ENG. L.R. 111 (1975); Note, The
"Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" Threshold and Uncompensated Injury under the Price-
Anderson Act, 6 RUT. CAM. L.J. 360 (1974).




visions. The finding that at least one jurisdiction would not be benefited does
not render this alternative remedy inadequate.
The proper analysis of the due process claim should have included a dis-
cussion of the reasonableness of the legislative scheme in accomplishing the valid
legislative purpose, the purpose of the Act being twofold: protection of the public
and promotion of the industry. 5 The Senate Report76 accompanying the most
recent revision of the bill includes an ample discussion of the means selected to
reach the conclusion that there is a reasonable relationship. Of course, Congress
'cannot immunize its legislation from scrutiny merely by asserting the validity of
the means selected, but no evidence was introduced challenging the validity of the
report's conclusions. If the Supreme Court does reach the merits of this case, it
will apply the "rational basis" test. Given the above considerations it is unlikely
that it will find the Act to be unconstitutional.
2. Equal Protection
It is important to start the consideration of equal protection with a discus-
sion of the applicable standards for review. This is particularly true in light of
the development of what has been called the "newer" equal protection. The
subtleties of the shifts in emphasis could be the subject of several articles, so the
attempt here will be to outline the development adequately to place Carolina
Environmental Study Group in the proper context.
Until recently, the test that the Supreme Court has applied in equal pro-
tection cases has been a two-tier approach. Most legislation has been subjected
to the first tier of review, sometimes called a "minimum rationality" test. The
classification established by the legislation must be reasonably related to a legiti-
mate state interest. 7 The application of this test virtually assured the constitu-
tionality of the act. It was commonly applied to economic regulations, and only
one case since 1937 invalidated an economic act on equal protection grounds.
That case, Morey v. Doud,7 was specifically overruled by City of New Orleans
v. Dukes 9 in 1976.
The second tier has been applied where the classification involved a discrete
and insular minority or a fundamental right. Although various justices have
advocated expansion of these categories, their scope is fairly well defined. The
suspect classifications are those based on race' and alienage.8 ' The fundamental
rights include voting,8 criminal appeals,8' travel,84 and procreation. 5 Cases
involving these suspect criteria are subjected to "strict scrutiny." The classifica-
75 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
76 S. RE-P. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONo. & Ai.
NEws 2251.
77 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
78 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
79 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
80 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
81 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
82 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
83 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
84 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
85 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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tion must be necessary for a compelling state interest.88 This test almost invari-
ably results in a finding of unconstitutionality.
While the two-tier test appears straightforward, its application has not been
mechanical.- Some-case-s-that-have-not-required strict scrutiny have been sub-
jected to a more rigorous standard than the rational basis test.8" This recognition
of some intermediate level of review has been called a "sliding scale," a term
first used by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Dandridge v. Williams.88 The exact
status of this intermediate level of review is uncertain. In Board of Retirement
v. Murgia89 the Court seemed to revert to a strict two-tier approach, but in
Craig v. Boren" the language used implied an adoption of the intermediate
level, wherein the classification must be substantially related to important govern-
ment objectives.9 Illegitimacy also appears to be a classification that will be
subjected to this level of review.92 Categories or rights (such as wealth, welfare
rights) that have been suggested as candidates for strict scrutiny may become
subject to the "sliding scale" review if this approach is fully embraced by the
Court.
The district court opinion in Carolina Environmental Study Group did not
outline the appropriate standard to be used, but the language indicates that the
minimum rationality test was applied. The Price-Anderson classification which
the court found offensive was those "people who happen to live in the areas
which may be touched by radioactive debris.""3 The court concluded that those
people are treated unequally because geographical happenstance dictates the
distribution of the losses associated with a nuclear incident, and because they
are treated differently than people damaged by other types of accidents.
Although the concept of rationality is highly subjective the Supreme Court
has been liberal in upholding legislation that has only a tenuous relationship to
the objective sought. An example of how far the Court will go in finding ra-
tionality is found in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 4 In commenting on a state
law the Court said that the law "may exact a needless and wasteful require-
ment ," as long as the legislature was not unreasonable in believing that the
statute was of some value.
Given this "hands-off" approach when applying a minimum rationality test,
it is extremely difficult to see how the Price-Anderson Act can fail to meet it.
One of the express purposes of the Act is the development of the nuclear industry.
No complaint is made about the permissibility of this purpose. The extensive
congressional testimony cited earlier in the discussion of the Act and the quota-
tions included in the district court's opinion clearly establish a reasonable rela-
86 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
87 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
88 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
89 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
90 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (different drinking ages based on sex).
91 Id. at 197.
92 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
93 431 F. Supp. at 225.
94 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
95 Id. at 487. This statute was upheld on both equal protection and due process grounds.
Although the above quote was taken from the due process discussion, the philosophy reflected
is applicable to an equal protection argument.
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tionship between the Act and the congressional purpose. The court bolsters its
conclusion of irrationality by finding that the act is "unnecessary to serve any
legitimate public purpose"9 but this does nothing to improve the appellee
plaintiff's position. A finding of necessity is not required.9 7
The failure to show that the Act is irrational will not automatically lead to
reversal. In Reed v. Reed,98 a sex discrimination case, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the strict scrutiny test was inapplicable and seemingly went on to
apply a minimum rationality test. The Court struck down the Act after subject-
ing it to closer scrutiny than the language suggested. This indicates that some
intermediate level of review was applied.
In Carolina Environmental Study Group the appellee plaintiffs must
convince the Supreme Court that the "sliding scale" should be applied to the
review of the Price-Anderson Act. In effect, this is what the district court did
without specifically so stating. The difficulty in supporting this position arises
from the fact that the classification objected to is not one which has ever been
suggested to require close scrutiny. The right to recover for property damage is
an economic or property right which has been traditionally subjected to a
minimum rationality standard. The case does not seem to involve issues to which
the Court will apply a "sliding scale" review. For this reason, the judgement of
the district court should be reversed. If the Supreme Court does reach the merits
of the equal protection claims it will likely apply a level of scrutiny that will
allow it to uphold the Act.
IV. Conclusion
The Price-Anderson Act was drafted in response to a liability insurance crisis
during the early stages of industrial participation in nuclear energy development.
The Act was designed to fulfill two purposes, financial protection of the public
from losses caused by a nuclear accident and promotion of the development of
the nuclear industry. These purposes have not changed through several revisions
of the Act. The goal of public protection is accomplished through mandatory
insurance, government indemnification for losses above insurance limits, waiver
of defenses (strict liability), and procedural rules for consolidating claims. The
development of the industry is promoted by moderately priced government in-
demnification (to be replaced by a system of retroactive premiums) and a limita-
tion on the liability that can be incurred from any nuclear incident.
The Carolina Environmental Study Group and the other individual
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the liability limitation provision.
They claimed that the construction of two nuclear power plants near their homes
by the Duke Power Company will subject them to environmental injuries that
are caused by the normal operation of a nuclear power plant. They alleged that
96 431 F. Supp. at 225.
97 In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court held that an inability to
demonstrate the necessity for the disclosure of a patient's name on required drug prescription
reports did not invalidate the requirement. They said the act "may not be held unconstitu-
tional simply because a court finds it unnecessary in whole or in part." Id. at 597.
98 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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without the Price-Anderson Act these plants would not be built and operated.
Additionally, they claimed that there would be the potential for uncompensated
losses in the event of a nuclear incident. The District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina heard the case and invalidated the limitation pro-
visions of the Price-Anderson Act on due process and equal protection grounds.
The case has been appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The appellees will have difficulty establishing their standing to maintain the
action and the ripeness of the issue. The problems stem from the tenuous rela-
tionship between the Act and the construction of the plants and the speculative
nature of the risks associated with operation of a nuclear plant. In order to reach
the merits of the case, the Supreme Court will have to take a more liberal ap-
proach to both standing and ripeness than they have in previous cases. Such an
occurrence is not anticipated.
In the event that the merits are reached in this or some future case, it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court will affirm the decision of the district court.
Since the legislation affects property rights and therefore is economic in nature,
the Court will not subject the Act to strict scrutiny. There is ample evidence to
find a rational relationship between the Act and its purposes. Although it used
the language of "rational basis," the district court appeared to apply a stricter
standard in reviewing the Act. There is no reason to believe that the Supreme
Court will adopt an intermediate level of scrutiny in this case. It is most prob-
able that the Court will reverse the district court and uphold the constitutionality
of the Price-Anderson Act.
Anthony F. Earley, Jr.
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